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Abstract: This study uses a sample of 34 disinflations undertaken by thirteen Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) 
nations to test if political institutions impact the cost of policy induced disinflations. We find, after controlling for several 
of the most important covariates in the literature, that disinflations are less costly for right vs left governments and that 
sacrifice ratios are lower for more democratic vs authoritarian governmental regimes. This is robust to different measures 
of government ideology as well as to alternative ways of computing the sacrifice ratio and lends support for political 
economy literature which argues that political institutions have significant macroeconomic effects. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Cross national differences in the output cost of policy 
induced disinflations (i.e. the sacrifice ratio) has been the 
focus of renewed interest in empirical monetary economics 
starting with Ball’s [1] influential paper. Studies 
investigating the importance of such factors as trade 
openness, speed, size and length of disinflations, degrees of 
central bank independence, incomes policies, and nominal 
wage contracts on accounting for differences in the output 
costs of disinflations have been conducted by authors such as 
Walsh [2], Temple [3] and Daniels, Nourzad and VanHoose 
[4]. In a recent contribution, Caporale and Caporale [5] test 
whether the political composition of governments can 
explain differences in the costs of disinflations and find, for 
a sample of OECD economies, that governments from the 
political right face lower sacrifice ratios. They argue that this 
is due to such governments’ stronger anti-inflation 
reputations, which renders disinflation policies undertaken 
during their tenure more credible. 
 One problem with drawing broad conclusions from the 
results of these previous studies is that their samples have 
been limited to a set of post-war developed democracies. 
This episode limitation has been addressed by Hofstetter [6] 
who computes the costs of disinflations for a sample of 
thirteen Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) nations 
covering the period 1973-2000. His nations were chosen due 
to their status as non-dollarized market driven economies 
with populations above two million people. 
 These episodes provide a unique setting in which to test 
if political institutions can help explain variations in 
measured sacrifice ratios. Since disinflationary periods are 
initiated by restrictive monetary (and often fiscal) policies,  
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their costs depend on how quickly the inflationary 
expectations of price and wage setters adjust to those 
policies as well as agent forecasts of the credibility of such 
policy changes. Although Caporale and Caporale [5] 
classified government types using a binary right-left 
designation, LAC nations allow for a richer amount of 
variation in the designation of political regime type since 
many of the disinflations were conducted by (both leftwing 
and rightwing) non-democratic forms of government. 
 By statistically treating the Hofstetter [6] LAC 
disinflations as an unbalanced panel, we find, after 
controlling for several of the most important covariates in 
the literature, that disinflations are less costly in right vs left 
governments and that sacrifice ratios are lower for more 
democratic vs authoritarian governmental regimes. We show 
that these results are robust to different measures of 
government ideology as well as to alternative ways of 
computing the sacrifice ratio. 
2. MEASURING THE SACRIFICE RATIO 
 Although the theory of a negative output-inflation 
tradeoff and the concept of the sacrifice ratio is an old one in 
macroeconomics, Ball’s [1] notable contribution has proven 
particularly useful in quantifying this relationship. The ratio 
measures the sum of the differences between the logs of 
trend and actual output divided by the change in trend 
inflation during a given disinflation episode. It is interpreted 
as the output loss (or cost) of reducing inflation by one point. 
This measure best fits instances where the fall in trend 
inflation is the result of explicit contractionary aggregate 
demand policies. 
 Hofstetter [6] overcomes several shortcomings associated 
with the Ball [1] measurement of the sacrifice ratio for his 
sample of 13 LAC nations using data gathered from the Penn 
World Tables. Table 1 presents these disinflation episodes. 
One important modification, most relevant for these high 
inflation nations, is that whereas Ball only considers peak  
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inflation rates at 20%, Hofstetter expands the cases for peaks 
up to 30%. He also, following Zhang [7], corrects for 
persistence effects by not requiring trend output to be at its 
actual level a year after the inflation trough. This allows for a 
long-run change in the natural rate of output thus resulting in 
a higher measured value for the sacrifice ratio than would be 
computed if such long-lived effects were ignored. Hofstetter 
also goes a step beyond Zhang’s extension of the Ball [1] 
methodology by taking into account inflation inertia, thus 
allowing output to peak even before peak inflation. 
 In this study we use both of these measures of LAC 
sacrifice ratios as our dependent variable. We designate them 
the “Hofstetter” and “Zhang” sacrifice ratios, respectively. 
Summary statistics for these series are presented in Table 2.
1
 
The mean value of the “Hofstetter” sacrifice ratio is .39 
which indicates that a one point reduction in inflation led, on 
average, to a .39 point total decline in real GDP from trend. 
Importantly, the large standard deviation, (1.70), and range 
between their high and low values, (6.00 to -1.90), allow us 
to efficiently test several hypotheses concerning variation in 
the sacrifice ratio through time and across countries. We 
later check the robustness of our results using the “Zhang” 
measure. 
3. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
 Given our limited degrees of freedom we test the 
significance of our political variables within the confines of 
a parsimoniously constructed model of the sacrifice ratio. 
Our model’s variables include the initial level of inflation 
from which the disinflation began. Ball, Mankiw and Romer 
[8] predict that the sacrifice ratio should be decreasing in the 
initial level of trend inflation. They argue that this is because 
higher inflation reduces the level of nominal rigidity and 
steepens the short run Phillips Curve. 
 We also, following Ball [1], Temple [3], and Caporale & 
Caporale [5], include the total change (or drop) in inflation 
in our model. Sargent [9] suggests that the size of the change 
                                                
1We thank Marc Hofstetter for generously providing us with his data. 
in inflation could be important since a large change may be 
perceived as a monetary policy regime shift, and thus could 
generate a shift in expectations, thereby lowering the 
sacrifice ratio. 
Table 2. Macroeconomic and Political Summary Statistics 
(1973-2000) 
 
Variable Mean St. Deviation High Low 
Sacrifice ratio Hofstetter 0.39 1.70 6.00 -1.90 
Sacrifice ratio Zhang 0.35 1.43 5.20 -1.20 
Initial Inflation 20.50 5.49 29.60 9.70 
Inflation Drop 11.15 4.76 21.20 4.10 
Speed of Disinflation 4.43 2.15 10.20 1.40 
Length of Disinflation 2.85 1.46 8.00 1.00 
% Right Government 0.54 0.47 1.00 0.00 
100% Right Dummy 0.47 0.51 1.00 0.00 
Polity 2 Index 3.77 5.87 10.00 -8.00 
 
 Our final macroeconomic control variables (also drawn 
from Ball [1]) are the length (in terms of years) of the 
disinflations as well as a measure of the speed of 
disinflation. Speed is defined as the total change in inflation 
divided by the length of the disinflation. Sargent [9] argues 
that quicker (shorter) as well as faster (speedier) disinflations 
may be viewed as monetary regime shifts, resulting in a 
more rapid adjustment of expectations relative to longer 
(more gradual) movements. The faster expectations are 
altered, the lower the sacrifice ratio will be. An alternative 
hypothesis regarding the effect of speed is found in Taylor 
[10] who argues, using a staggered wage adjustment model 
that quick disinflations will reduce output but more gradual 
disinflations can be theoretically costless.
2
 
                                                
2The empirical literature on the sacrifice ratio also tests for the importance 
of trade openness. Romer’s [11] influential paper suggests that disinflations 
Table 1. Latin American and Caribbean Disinflation Episodes (1973-2000) 
 
Bolivia 1990-1993 1995-1999    
Chile 1985-1988     
Columbia 1976-1978 1980-1983 1990-1996   
Costa Rica 1991-1993 1995-1998    
Dominican Republic 1974-1978 1980-1982 1984-1986   
Ecuador 1974-1976     
Guatemala 1974-1976 1986-1988 1996-1998   
Honduras 1973-1975 1979-1987 1990-1992   
Jamaica 1974-1976 1978-1982 1984-1987 1994-1998  
Mexico 1974-1975 1977-1978 1990-1993   
Paraguay 1973-1975 1979-1982 1993-1996   
El Salvador 1974-1976 1980-1982 1986-1988 1989-1991 93-99 
Venezuela 1980-1983     
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 Building on the work of Caporale and Caporale [5] we 
also investigate the importance of political factors in 
influencing the cost of disinflation. The significance of 
changes in political regimes in influencing macroeconomic 
outcomes been studied using rational partisan models (e.g. 
Alesina [12], Alesina and Roubini [13], Alesina, Roubini 
and Cohen [14]). In these models, conservative (or 
rightwing) governments are more inflation averse than 
liberal (or leftwing) governments and are thus more willing 
to engage in, or passively oversee, contractionary monetary 
policies (e.g., Grier [15]). The prediction of these models is 
that the probability and severity of recessions significantly 
rise with the establishment of a rightwing political regime. 
 The literature on the sacrifice ratio allows us to test the 
role that politics plays in influencing the cost of a given 
amount of disinflation. That is, the cost per point reduction 
of inflation (the sacrifice ratio) could well be lower under 
more conservative regimes since the public will view the 
disinflation policies of rightwing governments as more 
credible given their stronger anti-inflation reputations. Data 
on the nature of the different political regimes is obtained 
from Beck, Clarke, Keefer, Groff and Walsh [16] which 
categorizes governments using a “Right-Left” designation. 
We measure political stance using two different variables; 
the first, % Right, is the percentage of each disinflation 
episode that had rightwing governance. The mean value in 
Table 2 shows that 54% of the total disinflation years 
occurred under rightwing governments. 
 Data from Table 2 also reveals that almost half (47%) of 
disinflations were conducted solely under rightwing 
governments. This is shown in our alternative political 
variable, 100% Right Dummy, which is equal to one if the 
government in power is classified as rightwing for the entire 
period of the disinflation and zero otherwise. Defining the 
                                                                                
should be less costly in more open economies. We also experimented with 
including openness and found it to be consistently insignificant with its 
inclusion not affecting our other estimated parameters. These additional 
regressions are available upon request. 
variable in this way allows us to cleanly test whether 
disinflations begun, carried out and ended by rightwing 
governments have lower output costs per point drop in 
inflation than leftwing or political regime blends undertaking 
disinflations. 
 Our LAC sample enables us to test if democracy plays a 
role in explaining the costs of disinflation. This is a unique 
contribution to this literature that differs from the political 
economy model of Caporale and Caporale [5]. Unlike the 
developed OECD nations studied in most of the previous 
work on the sacrifice ratio, the regime types in our sample 
were rarely uniformly democratic. We measure the degree of 
democracy using a POLITY 2
3
 measure which ranges from 
+10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). Our 
hypothesis is that the cost of disinflation should be lower for 
more democratic governments since the openness of such 
regimes makes it less likely that the policy changes would 
come as a surprise and more likely that expectations shifts 
and price adjustments would occur more rapidly since policy 
changes should, at least in part, represent the preferences of 
the nation’s voting blocks. 
4. STATISTICAL RESULTS 
 In Table 3 we treat our dependent variable (the Hofstetter 
sacrifice ratio) as an unbalanced panel and estimate it using a 
fixed effects generalized least squares procedure with White 
cross sectional standard errors. This approach takes 
advantage of having repeated observations for each country 
by allowing the regression error variances to differ across 
nations. It also allows us to capture permanent differences 
between countries by including country specific dummy 
variables
4
. 
 Equation 1 shows that the initial level of inflation does 
not significantly influence the cost of LAC disinflations. 
                                                
3Data was obtained from the POLITY IV (Project Integrated Network for 
Societal Conflict Research Program, Center for International Development 
and Conflict Management (CIDCM) www.cidcm.undiedu/inscr/polity 
4A Hausman test rejects a random effects model in favor of the fixed effects 
one presented. 
Table 3. Modeling the Sacrifice Ratio as an Unbalanced Panel 
 
A. Regression with No Politics B. Regressions with Political Regressors 
Independent Variables 
Eq. 1
*
 Eq. 2
** 
 Eq. 3
***
 
Constant -0.39 (-0.65) 0.42 (0.59) 0.34 (0.51) 
Percent Right Government ----- -0.86 (-3.22) ----- 
100% Right Dummy ----- ----- -0.89 (-3.29) 
Polity 2 Index ----- -0.14 (-3.40) -0.14 (-3.43) 
Initial Inflation 0.12 (1.22) 0.10 (0.97) 0.10 (1.03) 
Drop in Inflation -0.40 (-4.08) -0.37 (-3.24) -0.37 (-3.24) 
Speed of Disinflation 0.25 (2.69) 0.29 (3.38) 0.29 (3.59) 
Length of Disinflation 0.56 (5.76) 0.62 (5.32) 0.62 (5.13) 
Adjusted R
2
 .09 .12 .12 
Cross Section ?2 (p-value) 21.35 (.045) 26.29 (.01) 24.48 (.01) 
Dependent Variable: Hofstetter Sacrifice Ratio (n=34, 13 cross sections). 
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*,**,***Estimated using Panel Generalized Least Squares with White cross section standard errors and cross section fixed effects dummies (see Table 4). 
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This is inconsistent with the Ball, Mankiw and Romer [8] 
conjecture but supports Ball’s [1] empirical finding. The 
negative and significant coefficient on the drop in inflation 
supports Sargent’s [9] argument that larger disinflations 
should be associated with those with lower costs since they 
would be viewed as signaling a move to a long-lasting, lower 
inflation environment. 
 We also find that the speed of disinflation positively and 
significantly (at greater than the .01 level) impacts the 
sacrifice ratio. This is opposite to the previous developed 
nation findings of Ball [1], Daniels, Nourzad and VanHoose 
[4], and Caporale and Caporale [5] and is consistent with the 
implication of Taylor’s [10] staggered contract model. The 
data also revels that longer disinflations are found to be more 
costly, on average, than briefer more decisive ones. 
 Our ?2 statistics for each of the equations in Table 3 show 
that our fixed effects are all jointly significant at least the .05 
level. The coefficients for the fixed effects models are shown 
in Table 4 and reveal that, after controlling for other 
explanatory variables, five of our 13 nations (Dominican 
Republic, Honduras, Jamaica, Paraguay and Venezuela) have 
intercept values (sacrifice ratios) that are higher than the 
group average. This supports the appropriateness of using 
the fixed effect framework to capture country specific 
heterogeneity. 
Table 4. Cross Section Fixed Effects Coefficients 
 
Country Eq. 1 Eq. 2
 
 Eq. 3 
Bolivia -1.60 -1.12 -1.33 
Chile -2.21 -2.86 -2.82 
Columbia -1.94 -1.14 -1.54 
Costa Rica -0.58 0.24 0.30 
Dominican Republic 0.92 0.62 0.68 
Ecuador -1.86 -2.64 -2.58 
Guatemala -0.60 -0.31 -0.23 
Honduras 2.26 2.41 2.50 
Jamaica 1.72 2.22 2.22 
Mexico -0.71 -2.00 -1.97 
Paraguay 0.12 -0.52 -0.44 
El Salvador -0.05 -0.33 -0.27 
Venezuela 1.77 2.89 2.98 
 
 Equation 2 (Table 3) tests our political hypothesis. It first 
shows that the incorporation of our political variables does 
not alter the signs or significance levels of our  
macroeconomic controls. The variable % Right is found to 
negatively and significantly impact the sacrifice ratio, thus 
supporting, using our LAC sample of disinflations, both our 
credibility hypothesis as well as the developed nation 
findings of CC [2008]. Our political regime coefficient is 
quantitatively large; the standardized coefficient on % Right 
is -24, which indicates that a one standard deviation increase 
in it leads to a .24 standard deviation (or .40 point) decline in 
the sacrifice ratio. Our Polity 2 index of democracy also 
lowers the sacrifice ratio and is significant at better than the 
.01 level. The standardized coefficient is -.48, thus a one 
standard deviation (i.e. 5.87 point) increase in Polity 2 
results in a .48 standard deviation (or .84 point) decline in 
the sacrifice ratio. These results demonstrate the importance 
of political factors in explaining cross-national and inter-
temporal differences in the cost of disinflations. 
 Equation 3 uses our 100 % Right Dummy to measure 
political regime type. Supporting our credibility hypothesis, 
the statistical results show that rightwing governance has a 
negative and statistically significant impact on the sacrifice 
ratio. The Polity 2 index of democracy remains negative and 
significant and the signs and significance levels of our 
macroeconomic control variables are not sensitive to using 
this alternative political measure. 
 Table 5 tests if our results are sensitive to different methods 
of computing the sacrifice ratio (SR). As noted above, 
Hofstetter [6] also applies the Zhang [7] method to compute 
LAC sacrifice ratios which allows for a long-run change in the 
natural rate of output but does not factor in inflation inertia. The 
mean value of the series is .35 which indicates that each 
percentage point reduction in inflation led, on average, to a .35 
% reduction in real GDP from potential. 
Table 5. Political Regimes and Latin American Sacrifice 
Ratios 
 
Independent Variables Eq. 4
*
 Eq. 5
** 
 
Constant 1.38 (3.28) 1.26 (3.47) 
Percent Right Government -1.02 (-3.13) ----- 
100% Right Dummy ----- 1.00 (-2.83) 
Polity 2 Index -0.13 (-3.80) -0.12 (-3.76) 
Initial Inflation 0.40 (0.54) 0.05 (0.63) 
Drop in Inflation -0.22 (-2.69) -0.23 (-2.76) 
Speed of Disinflation 0.13 (1.38) 0.13 (1.42) 
Length of Disinflation 0.37 (5.86) 0.36 (5.45) 
R
2 .09 .09 
Cross Section ?2 (p-value) 25.05 (.01) 25.11 (.01) 
Dependent Variable: Zhang Sacrifice Ratio (n=34, 13 cross sections). 
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*, **Estimated using Panel Generalized Least Squares with White cross section standard 
errors and cross section fixed effects dummies (see Table 6). 
 
 Equation 4 uses the “Zhang” sacrifice ratio as our 
dependent variable in a fixed effects panel model that 
incorporates both our macroeconomic control and two key 
political exogenous variables. The results again indicate that 
more democratic and rightwing type governments are 
significantly associated with less costly disinflations. The 
quantitative effects of the political variables are very close to 
those found for the “Hofstetter” series. We also find that the 
sign and significance of our macroeconomic control 
variables remain the same, with the notable exception being 
that our coefficient for the speed of disinflations fails to 
achieve statistical significance. The country fixed effects 
continue to achieve joint statistical significance. The fixed 
effect dummies for equation 4 (presented in Table 6) reveal 
that five nations in our sample (Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Honduras, Jamaica, Paraguay) have sacrifice ratios 
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larger than the group average after controlling for the effects 
of our right hand side variables. 
Table 6. Cross Section Fixed Effects Coefficients for Zhang 
Sacrifice Ratio Regressions 
 
Country Eq. 4 Eq. 5
 
 
Bolivia -0.83 -1.05 
Chile -1.86 -1.82 
Columbia -0.67 -1.16 
Costa Rica 0.24 0.31 
Dominican Republic 0.15 0.24 
Ecuador -1.88 -1.81 
Guatemala -0.11 -0.04 
Honduras 2.43 2.44 
Jamaica 1.64 1.65 
Mexico -2.01 -1.94 
Paraguay 0.12 -0.49 
El Salvador -0.26 -0.19 
Venezuela 2.29 2.37 
 
 Equation 5 substitutes our 100 Right Dummy measure 
of political regime for the continuous % Right Government 
variable. The data reveals that our fixed effects model 
continues to achieve statistical significance and that larger 
disinflations lower, and longer ones increase, the “Zhang” 
LAC sacrifice ratio. We consistently find that rightwing 
governance and having higher Polity2 measures has a 
negative and statistically significant impact on the sacrifice 
ratio. 
5. CONCLUSION 
 In contrast to most of the previous studies on the sacrifice 
ratio, we test if the costs of the disinflations for a sample of 
eighteen Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) nations 
covering the period 1973-2000, are influenced by the nature 
of political institutions. Following the developed nation 
study of Caporale and Caporale [5] our hypothesis is that 
sacrifice ratios should be lower under rightwing regimes 
since inflationary expectations of price and wage setters 
should adjust more quickly under such governments. We 
find, using two different methods of both computing the 
sacrifice ratio and measuring rightwing governance, strong 
support of this hypothesis. 
 In addition, since the regime types in our sample were 
rarely uniformly democratic, we test if the extent of 
democratic governance influences the cost of disinflation. 
Our statistical evidence reveals that democracies are 
associated with lower sacrifice ratios than more autocratic 
regimes. These results provide an additional source of 
confirmation for the growing political economy literature 
which argues that political institutions have significant 
macroeconomic effects
5
. 
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